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ABSTRACT
Concerns about climate change, diminishing social acceptance of traditional fuels, and
technological innovations have led several countries to pursue energy transition strategies,
typically by massive diffusion of renewable electricity supplies. The German ‘Energiewende’ has
been successful so far in terms of deploying renewable power, mainly by applying particular
feed-in tariffs, and by bundling public, academic, industrial and political support. So far though,
only few EU member states proceed with a similar transition. In March 2014 CEOs of Europe’s
major energy companies publicly opposed a fast and thorough transformation of electricity
supplies to become fully renewable. In April 2014 the European Commission published new state
aid guidelines, generally mandating renewable energy support mechanisms (premiums, tenders)
of lesser performance than regularly adjusted, specific feed-in tariffs. The new guidelines are
likely to be pernicious for the fast deployment of renewable electricity supplies.
In light of these challenges, this position paper highlights two implications of power sector
transitions. First, the engineering-economics theory of power generation systems needs
fundamental revision, mainly since a growing share of power sources no longer function on
command. Second, and based on the experience in Germany, the paper sketches out a strategy for
a thorough transition of the power sector, which, in the end, also entails normative judgements.
Deep changes in energy systems and associated ways of living require societal consensus
building based on ethical considerations.
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1. Introduction: Electricity industry transition
Transition of the existing energy systems in
industrialized countries is high on the climate and
energy policy agenda. According to IPCC [1] CO2-eq
emissions by industrialized economies need to be
reduced by 80 to 95 percent by 2050 compared to 2000
emissions and must peak prior to 2020, to stay below
2°C global average temperature increase on earth. This
message was reinforced by the 5th Assessment report of
IPCC [2]. Deployment of low-carbon energy systems by
the year 2050, or earlier, is the key goal, spearheaded by
rapid transitions to low-carbon electricity supplies.
Since 2007, more and more citizens, organizations,
companies, and politicians support IPCC’s findings.
Notwithstanding the growing support, lock-in is a
strong force of inertia [3]. Many people, companies, and
organizations live from fossil fuel and nuclear energy
supplies. Infrastructures, equipment, technology,
planned projects, practices, theory, mental maps, and
beliefs are hooked on low-priced availability of fossil
fuels and grid electricity. The related interests are
sizeable. The opposition against a fast and thorough
energy transition is real and organized. This paper does
not study the many lock-in factors. It signals how the
organized opposition against a fast transition went more
public in March 2014, when the CEOs of the major
energy companies in Europe proposed to change the
course of successful transition paths and retard the
deployment of distributed renewable electricity supplies
[4]. New EU Commission state aid guidelines under
preparation for some years, where published in April
2014 [5], and help to promote the CEOs agenda.
We contrast these activities with the opposite
perspective, which aims for thorough transition towards
more sustainable, 100% renewable, electricity supplies,
within a few decades. In 2010, electricity globally was
generated almost 4/5th by thermal plants [68% fossil +
11.7% nuclear fuelled], and 1/5th from renewable
sources [15.8% hydro + 4.5% from biofuels, waste,
geothermal, wind and direct solar] [6]. Bringing the
renewable energy share in electricity supply to almost
5/5th over the coming decades is a technological,
industrial, financial, political, and social challenge at
local, regional, and global levels [7, 8, 9].
This article focuses on two aspects of the transition
challenge. First, a generic issue is the engineering-
economic analysis and representation of integrated
electric power systems. A revision of the basic
assumptions about power supply sources and of the
engineering-economic theory and models based on these
assumptions is one example of the fundamental changes
(or rather reversals) a thorough transition of electricity
systems implies. The tenet of all power capacities being
fully under System Operator (SO) command is growing
obsolete with every new wind turbine or PV panel
coming on line.
Second, the positions and recent moves by the electric
power sector vested interests are discussed. In October
2013/March 2014 the sector interests triggered a
restoration campaign, designed to slow this transition. In
April 2014 the EU Commission published new state aid
guidelines that will likely have a pernicious impact on
the deployment of renewable energy supplies.
Counteracting restoration requires a renewed emphasis
on a thorough transition policy and action, implying
several reversals in conventional thinking and
practicing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
a short description of the engineering-economics theory
of optimal composition and least-cost operation of
integrated electric power generation systems. The
theorems are assuming that the SO can command the
power plant capacities. Section 3 describes how the
streamlined theory, already in the past was continuously
adapted to match technical and economic constraints
and facts of the real world.
Section 4 provides an overview of the first transition
phase in Europe’s electric power sector. The focus is on
Germany, and the ‘Energiewende’ is analysed as an
evolutionary model for the future. There is a concise
review of main factors that explain the launch of an
effective Energiewende.
Section 5 reports a few salient moments and elements
of the restoration campaign coordinated by the CEOs of
the major energy companies in Europe under the umbrella
of Magritte Group. It appears that through the new state
aid guidelines for energy (except nuclear power) of April
2014, the EU Commission supports the approach of the
major energy companies. Although several power
companies announced to undertake more activities and
investments in renewable energies and energy efficiency,
the danger is real that this restoration campaign will have
a strong retarding impact on the transition towards 100%
sustainable renewable energy supplies.
Section 6 provides an outline of basic steps needed to
avoid such pitfalls and to deploy a path for a thorough
transition; such outlines are common in strategic
planning. A clear mission provides framing for the
fundamental changes (reversals) that make up the
thorough transition. This section implies several
normative stances. A short conclusion is proposed in
section 7.
2. Electricity sector economics 1950-2000
The second half of the 20th century witnessed a tenfold
growth of global electricity use. More rivers were
dammed for harnessing hydropower. Nuclear power was
named backstop technology for substituting fossil fired
power, with breeder reactors and fusion to kick in well
within the horizon of the 20th century [10]. Nuclear
power would provide enough ‘electricity to all for all
uses’ (electric sector advertising in the 1960/70s).
Fossil-fired thermal power units scaled up from tens of
MW to thousands of MW, with increasing conversion
efficiency approaching the limits of physical laws.
These large-scale systems were top-down designed and
operated, with end-users absorbing ever more
electricity. Pollution, waste, and risks were largely
rolled off on nature, society, and the future.
Generation and transmission were highly controlled,
functioning on command by central system and plant
operators, with distributed generation languishing.
Engineering-economic models and practices governed
investments, operations, and pricing of electric power
[11]. The interlinked models answered the major
engineering-economic questions on reliably meeting the
demand for the non-storable electric current by end-
users: When should which capacities be built? How
should they be operated? Who should pay which costs?
The sublimated version of the theory assumes a
continuum of capacity options, from high fixed / low
variable costs (base-load) to low fixed / high variable
costs (peak-load). In an optimally composed generation
system, installed capacities run their number of hours as
least cost generator of the range. All plants function ‘on
command’: they supply power when the system operator
(SO) orders it, and they do not supply power when not
ordered by the SO. Because electric current is not
storable and is very rapidly transmitted over networks,
the operations occur ‘in real time’. Over brief time spans
(e.g., 15 minutes) available generation capacities are
ranked in merit-order by variable generation costs (fuel
and other avoidable running expenses). The variable
cost of the marginally loaded plant equals the short-run
marginal cost (SRMC) of the integrated generation
system, this being the theoretical proper kWh price of
generation for all end-uses during that brief time span.
When the sequence – investment, operations, pricing
– fits perfectly, the major issues of power supply achieve
neat solutions: all end-users during the real time interval
are treated equally via a SRMC-price, signalling the
momentary opportunity cost of generated power. In an
optimally composed and operated production park,
revenues obtained via SRMC-pricing would cover full
costs.
3. Recalcitrant realities preclude theoretical
optimality
Multiple technical, economic, and practical factors
challenge the sublimated theory [12]. First, economies
of scale, discrete sized generation units, sunk costs of
long-living assets, and fluctuating input factor prices
impede optimal compositions of electricity production
systems. At the operations side, start-up costs, limited
ramping rates, ‘must run’ units having priority over
cheaper plants and spinning capacities disturb the
simplicity of textbook merit-order rankings and blur the
meaning of SRMC prices. The difficulty to 
calculate with precision less visible external costs
related to the placement, functioning, emissions and
waste of power plants, is used as excuse to reject or
minimize the inclusion of these costs in the accounts and
in the prices of delivered power. Smart metering and
ICT significantly extend the ability to control real time
operations, governed by many factors [13]. But how
practical is it for most end-users to process themselves
the information overload? In the case of most electricity
consumers, end-use prices do not reflect the swinging
SRMC pointers, but are constant prices per kWh
delivered over the month (year) or two-part (per kW
capacity and per kWh), and sometimes with separate
peak and off-peak period measuring and billing. Also,
pricing is highly influenced by regulators with other
logics, criteria, and frameworks than engineering-
economic optimality.
Second, follow-up of actual power generation systems
is a full time expert job, applying theoretical models and
various practices under ever-changing circumstances.
Distinctive variables fluctuate permanently, as do SRMC
signals that mark the functioning of power systems [13].
As a corollary, most non-expert parties (small businesses,
households) may lack the knowledge and time to
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comprehend sufficiently electric power systems to benefit
from its erratic intricacies. We assess that the
revenues/expenses ratio of small and residential end-users
muddling in intricate electricity system balancing issues
is very low: promoting such participation holds no
societal merit as some expect [14, 15]. By contrast, simple
and transparent public regulations shield small power
producers and end-users from this duty, e.g., by preferring
stable feed-in tariffs (FIT) to fluctuating tradable green
certificates or premiums paid on top of power prices
settled at power exchanges (sections 4 and 5).
Third, power generators, not commanded by SO,
cause nuisance. Apart from several generator and plant
classifications (incumbent/independent; central/
distributed; large/small), the distinction commanded
/autonomous is the really discerning one. ‘Commanded’
permits the full institutional dispatching of a generation
capacity by SO, i.e., when ordered, current is delivered
or throttled (taking into account physical and technical
plant constraints). Commanded plants are single-
directionally linked to the grid, and only deliver power.
‘Autonomous’ limits or excludes control by SO, except
in protecting the technical safety of the synchronous
power system, when autonomous generators are
connected to the grid [16]. Due to electric current being
non-storable, grid connection mostly ensures the best
reliability/cost ratio for autonomous power plants.
Electric currents may then flow bi-directionally: either
as back-up power from the grid to the autonomous site
(bridging the gap between own generation and own
demand when the former is lower than the latter), or to
the grid as surplus power generated beyond the site’s
consumption.
In most of the 20th century few autonomous
generators survived as on-site (often industrial
cogeneration) power plants. The 1978 PURPA
legislation in the USA opened the grid to mainly
independent generators, some functioning rather as
single-directional commanded capacities, others as bi-
directional autonomous capacities. By liberalization,
more inroads on franchised utility monopolies occurred,
often by incumbent electricity companies from other
areas. Except for liberalized systems designed with a
mandated pool, the authority of SO concentrates on
balancing and other ancillary services. Delivery and
throttle orders are then sent through hourly system
power price signals. Economic rationality normally
induces plant owners to only run their capacity during
hours when their SRMC is lower than the exchange
price at that hour. Notwithstanding the theory’s
deficiencies, it remains embraced by most academics
and practitioners.
4. First transition steps in Europe’s electricity
sectors
Just as the USA [17], Europe showcases a variety of
electricity supply industries rooted in their historical
national predecessors, e.g., France’s dependence on
nuclear power. Most member states housed vertically
integrated (public or private) monopolies for generation
and transmission in franchised areas. Distribution and
delivery to small customers belonged to the vertical
monopoly or were assigned to local – generally public –
undertakings (e.g., municipal power plants in Germany).
Power supply theory and practices (section 2) prevailed
in a patchwork of implementations.
So far, EU directives enacted in three stages (1996,
2003, and 2009) impose market liberalization.
Unbundling of the main functions, third party access,
and privatization allow more exchange and ‘foreign
shopping’ by the EU’s incumbent power companies. But
limited interconnection capacity, locked-in national
customs, and inherited infrastructure and systems retard
and mock the single European electricity market. The
liberalization agenda was complemented by climate
change policies after 1997 (Kyoto Protocol) requiring
fundamental changes [18], and by the directive on the
promotion of renewable electricity in 2001 [19]. The
European Commission organized climate policy at EU
scale with the Emissions Trading Scheme as flagship.
Already in the early phase of European renewable
energy policy different visions of the member states
became obvious. In 1998−99, the Commission insisted
on establishing a tradable green certificates market for
supporting renewable electricity but did not prevail in
either Council or Parliament. To rescue its feed-in tariffs
(FIT) Germany rejected the European Commission
plans [20]. Only few governments then favoured a
system based on tradable green certificates.
Germany (second to Denmark) took a lead in
transforming its electricity sector from a fossil-nuclear
system to near-fully renewable energy supplies. This
leadership is rooted in societal, academic, and political
circles with a strong aversion to nuclear power and an
argued belief in renewable energy potentials [21, 22].
The 1986 Chernobyl disaster brought a majority of the
population to reject nuclear power. After a brief reversal
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in 2010 (postponement of nuclear phase-out), the 2011
Fukushima disaster led to the reinstatement, on a
broader political basis, of the phase-out decision taken
in 2000. This decision was sealed by the advice from an
Ethics commission, which was composed of a
representative panel of German civil society [23]. This
illustrated how crucial decisions, stretching far in time,
ridden with uncertainty, incomplete knowledge and
irreversibility, cannot be resolved by technical-
economic cost/benefit studies or lobbyism politics, but
need the ethical, overarching perspective fostered by
civil societies [24]. The ethical dimension has been
important in the German nuclear energy policy debates,
particularly in the German Parliament from 1986 to well
into the 2000s; it reached a summit with the formal
instalment of the Ethics Commission in 2011.
Germany is engaged in a fast transition to full
renewable electricity supplies [25, 26]. The renewable
electricity share increased from 6.6% in 2000 to 27.3%
of domestic consumption in 2014 [27]. New renewables
now account for the largest share of any energy source
in the German power mix. The role of well-designed
financial support for renewable electricity generation
projects has been vital for this success up to 2014. Key
aspects of the support systems included:
• Investment reliability for renewable energy
generators was secured via fixed tariffs per kWh
for 20 years. Thus, remuneration was not exposed
to market risks. These features meant low
investment risk and facilitated raising mortgages.
• With support linked to the energy delivered,
FITs provide better incentives for efficient
functioning of the plants than support linked to
capacity or investment expenses.
• Renewable electricity deployment was not
curtailed by quota; utilities have to purchase all
renewable power on offer. In addition, since the
FIT bill is levied on grid electricity end-users via
a surcharge, the growth of renewable electricity
was not exposed to public budget problems or
(except the past few years) political setbacks.
• FITs are set to reflect the projected levelized
cost prices of renewable energy projects over 20
years, differentiated by technologies and
capacity, adjusted automatically (usually
annually) to account for cost degression, and
regularly reviewed. Actual growth of renewable
electricity supplies systematically far exceeded
the forecasts.
• This stable and predictable support system led to
the rapid growth of renewable power supplies
from non-utilities, mostly private persons and
farmers [28, 29]. It also stimulated the German
industry to become a world leader in PV and
wind turbine technologies, in design and
engineering, and in exports of machine tools and
whole production factories. The industry has
been highly successful at lowering the cost of
renewable electricity technologies, but – in the
case of PV cells – was severely damaged by a
trade war with Chinese producers and a
domestic PV policy that reinforced the crisis of
the sector.
• Things began to change in 2010 Since 2010
electricity from renewable sources is mainly
sold on the day ahead spot market, lowering the
wholesale price and revenues from the sale of
EEG power by 0.5 - 1 ct/kWh [30], but
increasing the surcharge on consumers, while
rewarding the incumbent power generators.
• Electricity-intensive industries benefit from this
merit-order-effect, i.e. the replacement of fossil
fuels with substantial operating costs by wind
and solar generation with almost zero operating
costs, while being largely exempted from paying
the surcharge.
• The EEG surcharge rose from 2.05 €ct/kWh in
2010 to 6.24 €ct/kWh in 2014 and now
accounts for nearly 20% of household
electricity prices. This increase is mainly due
to the fast expansion of renewable power
supplies and to increasing exemptions for
electricity-intensive industry [31]. These
exemptions increased steeply in the first half
of the current decade (from one to about five
billion Euros), further adding to the surcharge
on small consumers.
• The EEG surcharge on small consumers rose
from 2.05 €ct/kWh in 2010 to 6.24 €ct/kWh in
2014 and now accounts for nearly 20% of
household grid electricity prices. The major
causes of this increase are: the merit order effect
of lower prices for wholesale power is not
passed on to households; more surcharge
exemptions for electricity-intensive industry
rolled on households; legacy cost of PV installed
in previous years when this was still very 
costly [31].
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• Since 2014 (2010 for PV) there are ‘flexible
caps’ on renewable electricity expansion,
reducing compensation if caps are exceeded.
EEG 2014 [32] means to cap the former
unlimited growth, e.g. at 2.5 GW/year each for
onshore wind and PV. To enforce this constraint,
the EEG 2014 amendment provided for faster
and steeper adjustments of support levels than in
the past (monthly for PV, quarterly for onshore
wind and biomass), also as a response to
growing critique since 2010 that FIT expenses,
or quantity of capacity installed, or both, came
down too slowly, in particular for PV.
• The costs of renewable power technologies have
dropped significantly since the EEG was
introduced. Most prominently, the system costs
of photovoltaic installations in Germany
decreased by over two thirds in the last eight
years, i.e. from 5100 EUR/kWp in 2006 to 1640
EUR/kWp in 2014 [33]. The speed of the
transition accelerated continuously between
2000 and 2014. To put an end to this
acceleration, EEG 2014 nips the growth to a
lower rate than that achieved in recent years.
The German Energiewende is embedded in a
supportive socio-technical environment, including
R&D-intensive providers of renewable technologies and
system components. R&D results are broadly
disseminated (www.bine.info). Despite relatively high
power prices for end users, which burden low-income
households, support for a decentralised Energiewende
remains overwhelming [34]. After all, Germany is a
wealthy country, and the GDP share of end-user
electricity expenditures in 2012 was only about 2.5%,
roughly the same as in 1991 [35].
Since 2011 (Fukushima; Ethics Commission), the
German Energiewende builds on an even broader
societal, but not political, consensus, spanning also
across the lines of the major political parties, despite
some wavering government decisions. At least two of
the four big utilities (notably EnBW and E.ON, more
recently also Vattenfall) are reconsidering their business
models. Electricity-intensive industries continue to
request lower energy prices despite they enjoy
comparatively favourable electricity prices for German
industry [36]. Other industrial companies benefit from
the new opportunities and some changed their strategy
(notably Siemens which quit building nuclear plants and
now is the worldwide leader on offshore wind turbines).
New societal preferences are triggered by citizens,
communities, grassroots initiatives, and cooperatives.
Citizens own about half the installed renewable capacity
and a growing share of renewable electricity generation
is forthcoming from small-scale projects [37, 38].
However, replacing FITs by bidding systems in 2017 
(a reform laid down in EEG 2014, in line with new EU
state aid guidelines, and which started in 2015 with a
first pilot non-rooftop PV installations) is likely to
inhibit the growth of prosumers as non-professional
investors might have difficulty to deal with increasing
transaction costs and related risks.
The strong post 2011-societal consensus on
renewable power contrasted with growing
disagreements on EEG at the level of political elites. A
new consensus between the two major parties (CDU,
SPD) is reflected in EEG 2014 whose purpose it is to
reduce the annual growth rate of renewable capacity by
caps and to reduce the cost of such power by forsaking
feed-in tariffs and market premiums by a shift to bidding
systems. So far the EEG 2011 targets for 2050 – 80%
renewable electricity by 2050, in stages – have not been
modified, except for the fact that former minimum goals
now became upper limits (caps).
Energiewende in Germany is not just a story of
smooth deployment. In recent years its critics became
more vocal, especially as regarded the supposedly high
costs of feed-in tariffs and in particular PV tariffs [39].
PV tariffs however came down radically since then, and
the cost debate is distorted, for example by confusing
high legacy costs of pioneer technology investment with
lower later costs of more matured technology, that
however only could be obtained by the high investment
in preceding pioneer projects [40]. The Bavarian
government continues to militate against wind energy,
while nearly all other Bundesländer improved the
supporting schemes for wind energy. Some connections
of offshore wind farms are behind schedule. Foreign
critics argue that paradoxically Energiewende led to a
higher use of coal. But the brief trend of higher use of
coal in 2012 and 2013 was mainly due to lower coal
prices, which were not counteracted by CO2 emissions
taxes or sufficiently priced emissions allowances. The
insufficient pricing of externalities and risks of fossil
fuel and nuclear-based power generation is a major bias
against the deployment of renewable energy supplies.
However, the trend of more coal use was broken in
2014. Also, peaks in supplies of wind and of solar power
at almost zero marginal cost, disturb the standard merit
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order loading of commanded capacities. The
oversupplies by inflexible capacities, occasionally lead
to very low (a few times negative) system prices, not
rewarding the actual generation costs of the plants, with
inroads on the returns of incumbent companies owning
large-scale base-load plants.
The critics of the before 2014 Renewable Energy Act
joined forces with the EU Commission (section 5 of this
manuscript), to facilitate the enactment of EEG 2014,
whose purpose it is to rein in ‘excessively’ rapid
renewable power deployment. Among other things,
EEG 2014 aims to end accelerated growth of renewable
power (achieved up to now), which suits the major
power companies and those who argue that more rapid
deployment might endanger Germany’s competitive
position in the world economy.
Many other European governments have been
arguing for some time that Europe as a whole has taken
on excessive climate policy burdens, which endanger its
industry. Some criticize the German nuclear phase-out
for ‘lack of solidarity’. This inertia is related to habits,
convictions such as disbelieving renewable energy
potentials while trusting incumbent accounts of a
‘transition crisis’, vested interests and technological
lock-ins also play an important role (e.g. coal in Poland;
nuclear in the UK). Many governments consider the
2008 EU target of 20% renewable energy, and the new,
non-binding overall target of 27% by 2030, as ambitious
enough. The (formerly) high cost of PV, the merit-order
effect’s impact on incumbents’ profits and the 2014
reorientation of the Energiewende in Germany became
an argument for several other European governments to
limit their efforts for a similar energy transition [40].
5. Restoration by vested interests
Modest growth of renewable electricity supplies, often
the result of wavering policies and ineffective support
systems, makes slight inroads on established power
supply systems, resistant against low degrees of
nuisance. But already ten percent of renewable wind and
solar electricity have a substantial impact on
incumbents’ profits through the merit order effect
(reducing wholesale prices) and of course reduce the
output of gas, coal and nuclear plants.
The CEOs of the largest European energy companies
defend their present core assets. On March 19, 2014
under the aegis of the Magritte Group, they issued a ‘call
for government and state heads to implement immediate
and drastic measures to safeguard Europe’s energy
future’ [4]. ‘Nine recommendations to reform Europe’s
energy and climate policy so as to achieve the three key
objectives of competitiveness, sustainability and
security of supply’, are complemented by three
proposals (www.gdfsuez.com): preference for ‘mature
renewables in the regular market’, ‘priority to the
utilization of existing competitive power capacity rather
than subsidizing new constructions’, and ‘restore the
ETS as a flagship climate and energy policy’. The
proposals are likely to slow down the deployment of,
mainly decentralized, renewable power, and of the
further development of so far non-mature technologies.
On April 9, 2014, the EU adopted new
“Environmental and Energy State Aid Guidelines for
2014-2020” [5]. The Guidelines make bidding systems
the central support instrument for renewable power in
the future and ban feed-in tariffs for most situations, thus
abolishing a key instrument of Energiewende. They
consider exemptions from renewable energy surcharges
for industrial companies as state aid and require that
these companies make a contribution, which however
may be limited to a fraction of the rates small customers
pay. On July 23, 2014 the European Commission
accepted a compromise German EEG 2014. The overall
goal of these guidelines is to reduce the supposed burden
from renewable power support in the name of European
competitiveness and affordability of the electricity bills.
The likely intention is to contain renewable power
growth to lower levels than so far, and to give big
corporate operators a better position to replace
prosumers as chief generators of renewable electricity
(in Germany and some other FIT countries, the
corporates largely underestimated the role of
prosumers).
The common practice of juxtaposing and trading-off
‘quid pro quo’ the three EU energy policy goals hides
their hierarchic and interdependent relationships. When
analysing the three interrelated goals, the first and
leading one is sustainability; this first goal can only be
realised by the thorough transition to harvesting
renewable energy sources available on European lands
and seas. Such sustainable energy systems naturally
bring security of supply as a corollary because use is
made of domestic European energy sources, and
dependence on precarious imports and unreliable
external forces diminishes by every new local renewable
flow harvested. The sustainable and secure energy
systems become affordable through technological
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innovation, because technology is the par of energy
sources to obtain energy supplies. Technological
success is feasible when unfettered priority is given to
the transition, demonstrated clearly by the German
Energiewende. The actual cascading interdependencies
contrast with the official trade-off narrative between
sustainability, security, and affordability.
Assigning superior weight to ‘market’ functioning
above sustainable development is a case of confusing
means and goals. The electricity ‘market’ is still
dominated by major power companies, with fossil-
nuclear fuelled capacities that produce a range of
accompanying externalities and risks. The Guidelines
and EEG 2014 impose the biased markets as basis for
future renewable plants >100kW [32]. On April 9th,
European Commissioner Almunia, then responsible for
competition policy, stated: ‘Many renewable energy
sources have reached a scale and a level of maturity
that allows them to compete with other sources.’ This
statement would undoubtedly hold if ‘other sources’
were priced at total costs, including externalities and
risks, and if the available energy infrastructures and
institutions suited renewable energy. But this is not the
case, something that hinders the establishment of a
level playing field. Renewables may be on the way to
competitiveness even so, but their progress will be
slowed. Moreover, on 8 October 2014 EU’s
competition commissioner, Joaquín Almunia approved
intended loan guarantees and price commitments for
UK’s nuclear power project Hinkley Point C [41]. A
level playing field does not seem to be required for
new construction of nuclear fission power.
Premiums, quota with tradable certificates, and
bidding systems (tenders, auctions) become substitutes
for FIT tariffs (except for < 100kW new projects during
the next 10 years), although earlier experience
evidenced high windfall profits, more administrative
and transaction expenses, higher risks for small
investors, and lower effectiveness [42, 43]. Stop/go
jamming of the deployment pace is caused, for example,
by legislators squeezing the funding or by speculative
uneconomic bids. Some countries experienced
widespread failure to deploy schemes that had been
awarded contracts under competitive biddings
[44,45,46, 47].
We assess that the overall result of the Guidelines
will be not only to slow the current dynamics of
renewable technology deployment, but also its
development; this will weaken the European market and
most likely affect the international positioning of many
European renewable power manufacturers [48].
Germany as a well-endowed and experienced renewable
electricity developer may eventually overcome such
setbacks. But what about member states at an earlier
phase of the transition path?
6. Vision for a thorough transition
Corporate strategy theory and practice teach that success
is preceded by visions. Without a vision, success is
unlikely. The thorough transition of electric power
systems from fossil fuel and nuclear dependent top-
down constructions, towards exclusively renewable
energy supplies from mainly local resources and
therefore bottom-up directed, means a full U-turn. In
such cases, it is important that practical action follows a
strategic meta-vision on the transition to low-carbon
electricity supplies, specifying a mission and
fundamental changes (reversals) prerequisite in
accomplishing the mission. The explicit formulating of
a mission (the end-goal) and changes (the way from here
to the end-goal) requires a thorough sustainability
assessment of what a ‘good’ electricity industry is.
Pending the results of such assessment, a default version
is proposed here. We thereby abstract from comparing
the possible designs of technical power systems and
markets [49, 50, 51]. ‘Flexibility options’ may protect
incumbent power systems against surging inroads by
fast and unforeseen expansion of renewable power flows
form wind and PV. Our position is that such inroads are
necessary to generate the destructive Schumpeterian
innovations the future needs.
6.1. Mission.
Leading industrialized and industrializing countries and
regions in the world (e.g., G20 and OECD member
countries; EU) transform their electricity sectors to
100% renewable energy based supplies. Locally
available natural flows (wind, solar, water, biomass),
harvested to a large extent by prosumers, deliver the
main share of the supplies. Centralized renewable power
plants are placed and designed to complement and back-
up the local sources, with the caveat that the need for
such centralized back-up is minimized by giving priority
to flexibility options (demand responses, load
management, storage facilities, opening the heat market
as a sink for surplus electricity) and to strengthening
grids and interconnections. Electric utilities design
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business models to assist prosumers, guaranteeing
network services, frequency and voltage stability.
Regulators control the performance of the utilities and
the prices charged for delivered services. The
transformations are kick-started without further delay,
and the highest pace is pursued.
6.2. Fundamental changes (reversals). 
The electricity supply systems intended by the mission,
are of a very different nature than today’s dominant
fossil-nuclear fuelled ones. Significant adaptations and
reversals in electricity supply paradigms and market
structures are prerequisites for starting the
transformations with proper impulses in the right
directions. The main reversals proposed here:
• Adopting a mission similar to section 6.1 for the
intended transition. This societal-political
adoption is crucial and prerequisite for
undertaking successful transitions.
• The fast development of local renewable,
reliable electricity supplies, as core of smart
energy systems, is the principal goal of energy
and related R&D and industrial policies.
• The mission reverses previously dominant
perspectives, positions, responsibilities, and cost
allocations:
° Perspectives: the future electric power
systems are the vantage points to evaluate
proposed and ongoing actions and transition
programs. Back casting prevails over
forecasting. Clarified perspectives avoid the
new build of non-sustainable fossil and
nuclear power plants.
° Positions: the established, inherited electric
power systems are main sources of climate
and nuclear risks, nature and environment
degradation, human health dangers. The old
systems have to be replaced as-soon-as-
possible, also when this implies stranded
investments.
° Responsibilities: today, variable renewable
electricity supplies disrupt established power
systems. The obsolete discourse tells the
disruptors that they are responsible for their
impacts on existing systems. The opposite
must be upheld: non-sustainable, incumbent
systems are responsible for damage and risks,
and their phase-out is a necessity.
° Cost allocation: the obsolete discourse wants
to charge renewable electricity challengers
with the expenses of their integration into
obsolescent incumbent generation and
network systems. This conflicts with the
polluter pays, alias extended producer
responsibility, principle. The principle
implies that non-sustainable, prevailing
power systems assume the responsibility for
the expenses of ‘disruption’ caused for giving
way to the requirements of upcoming,
sustainable, renewable supplies. At minimum,
incumbent systems should stop increasing the
burdens for a thorough transition.
• The theory and handbooks on electricity
economics need revision. The old model
assumes all power capacities function on
command. The future sustainable power systems
own limited capacities on command (hydro
reservoirs, bio fuelled plants, and new forms of
storing energy from converting power),
compared to overwhelming redundant capacities
for harnessing natural energy flows (wind, solar,
water). Natural flows can be by-passed, not
commanded, either by people or by system
operators. With SRMC near zero they claim first
places in the merit-order loading. Next to large
renewable plants, there will be a huge number of
small-scale plants, often set up as smart energy
systems with integration of heat, power,
transportation and gas, and owned by customers,
cooperatives, and communities. They first serve
own needs and interact with the grid bi-
directionally. Such electricity sources are the
future default, normal ones. Their integrated
functioning requires continuous utility support
in transmission, central storage, backup and
balancing power. The future theory and practice
rejects the axiom that the sustainable sources
‘disrupt’ the present non-sustainable power
systems. This rethinking of power systems with
all its consequences is challenging the creativity
of scientists, engineers, and regulators.
Formulating the new sustainable energy mission and
exploring the changes necessary for its accomplishment,
surpasses the boundaries of traditional cost-benefit
analysis. It implies an iterative social learning process
and ethical norms as the foundation for a wide
consensus.
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7. Conclusion
IPCC [1, 2] already stated that mitigation should reduce
emissions by 80 to 95% in industrialized societies by
2050. This implies electricity generation will need to be
practically carbon free. The electricity sector is essential
for spearheading the transition to a low-carbon energy
economy. Vested interests locked into carbon intensive
power and/or into nuclear generation options retard the
breakthrough and the full deployment of renewable
electricity supplies. . A major lesson learnt on the
promotion of renewable energy is that its deployment is
a long-term and evolutionary process that requires
enduring policy support [43]. In contrast the April 2014
EU State aid guidelines strengthen the restoration, which
could lead to wasting precious years for mitigating
climate change [50]. For avoiding further lock-in by 
non-sustainable energy systems, infrastructures, and
institutions, a thorough energy transition strategy is
required. Agreement on a clear mission, and awareness
and acceptance of deep reversals, are major ingredients
of this strategy. For example, applying the extended
polluter pays principle assigns the responsibility for
present system disturbance not to the renewable energy
challengers but to the non-sustainable incumbents. The
reversals also call for novel electricity engineering
economics theory and practice. The proposed strategy
is not fully developed, but a first response to recent
turns in electricity policy making which are likely to
extend carbon lock-in. Maybe the emerging sustainable
renewable electricity options are already developed
enough to resist these efforts to delay the energy
transition. But we must also realise that time is of
essence, and that we need clear orientations for an
electricity policy that can help minimise climate
change.
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